Final Version Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment and Functional Safety Concept. D2.14 of H2020 project ENSEMBLE
report
This deliverable consists of the following two work products:
1) Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA). The objectives of the HARA are:
a. to identify and to categorise the hazardous events caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item;
b. to formulate the safety goals related to the prevention or mitigation of the hazardous events, in order to avoid unreasonable risk.
2) Functional Safety Concept (FSC). The objectives of the FSC are:
a. to derive the functional safety requirements from the safety goals;
b. to define the safe state strategy and/or the Minimum Risk Manoeuvre (MRM) for each functional safety requirement.
The above-mentioned activities have been undertaken separately for the Platooning Support Function (PSF) (Chapter 2) and the Platooning Autonomous Function (PAF) (Chapter 3). For the PSF, a total of 43 cases (combination of operational situation and malfunction) were analysed. As a result, 2 cases having an ASIL above QM (Safety critical) have been identified, one classified with an ASIL A and the other one classified with ASIL B. The related hazardous event is the “unintended longitudinal deceleration by the ego vehicle”, and are of concern for other vehicles following the platoon closely. Therefore, “Rear end collision due to unintended braking of the platoon shall be prevented” has been defined as a Safety Goal, with an ASIL B.
1) Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA). The objectives of the HARA are:
a. to identify and to categorise the hazardous events caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item;
b. to formulate the safety goals related to the prevention or mitigation of the hazardous events, in order to avoid unreasonable risk.
2) Functional Safety Concept (FSC). The objectives of the FSC are:
a. to derive the functional safety requirements from the safety goals;
b. to define the safe state strategy and/or the Minimum Risk Manoeuvre (MRM) for each functional safety requirement.
The above-mentioned activities have been undertaken separately for the Platooning Support Function (PSF) (Chapter 2) and the Platooning Autonomous Function (PAF) (Chapter 3). For the PSF, a total of 43 cases (combination of operational situation and malfunction) were analysed. As a result, 2 cases having an ASIL above QM (Safety critical) have been identified, one classified with an ASIL A and the other one classified with ASIL B. The related hazardous event is the “unintended longitudinal deceleration by the ego vehicle”, and are of concern for other vehicles following the platoon closely. Therefore, “Rear end collision due to unintended braking of the platoon shall be prevented” has been defined as a Safety Goal, with an ASIL B.
TNO Identifier
981875
Publisher
European Union
Collation
222 p.