Privacy for Key-Trees with Adaptive Adversaries
conference paper
Hash-lock authentication protocols for Radio Frequency IDentification
(RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have
been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys
in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Butty´an [3]
and Beye and Veugen [2] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but
assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel
information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can
be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that
are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical
analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new
requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test
its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive
attacks.
(RFID) tags incur heavy search on the server. Key-trees have
been proposed as a way to reduce search times, but because partial keys
in such trees are shared, key compromise affects several tags. Butty´an [3]
and Beye and Veugen [2] devised trees to withstand such attacks, but
assumed adversaries to be non-adaptive, without access to side-channel
information. We illustrate how in practice, side-channel information can
be used to attack the system. We also describe adaptive attacks that
are easy to mount and will significantly reduce tag anonymity. Theoretical
analysis of the implications on anonymity in key-trees leads to new
requirements and a new tree construction. Simulation is used to test
its performance, the results showing an improved resistance to adaptive
attacks.
TNO Identifier
463787
Source title
7th International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks - SecureComm 2011, September 7-9 2011, London, UK
Files
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