Modelopzet voor Dodehoek Detectie en Signalerings Systemen (DDSS)
report
Connekt performs the current research for the Ministry of Transport in which an inventory is made of the blind spot situation (and the interaction between traffic participants) and the possibilities of detection and signaling are defined. The main purpose of this research is the gathering of knowledge. Knowledge about the behavioral component of both the driver and the vulnerable road users in this situation, as well as innovative detection and signaling systems of interaction between systems, and the driver environment. The official definition of the blind spot is the area around the truck that drivers are not able to see, not even with the help of mirrors and/or camera’s. This definition is nowadays not very practical anymore, since the driver can see the whole area in front, to the left and to the right of the truck with the help of mirrors and camera’s. That is why the following definition of the blind spot is used in this project: “The blind spot is the area in front or next to the truck where vulnerable road users run the risk of being hit”. The study aims at the detection of vulnerable road users and the behavioral change of truck driver and vulnerable road user at the moment a (possible) danger develops and the interaction between road users, with or without technical support. Connekt has asked TNO en SWOV to contribute to this study by means of a literature survey,
an overview of existing blind spot systems and techniques, interviews with drivers, formulating a conceptual model of the factors that lead to certain action and interactions of traffic participants in blind spot situations. Based on the gained knowledge and the conceptual model, an optimal blind spot detection and signaling system is defined. In the literature survey a number of models is discussed that deal with information processing and workload of truck drivers and drivers in general. These models show that a truck driver sometimes overlooks another vulnerable road user because of ‘structural inference’. This means that the direct view on the other road user is blocked or the driver just looked in the other direction. Another reason is ‘resource competition’, referring to a limited information processing capacity, by which not all visual information can be processed by the driver. Information processing in a certain situation is therefore dependent on the workload of a driver and therefore also dependent on the task demands of the traffic situation. The task demands are not only determined by the complexity of the traffic situation, but also on the choices the truck driver makes with regard to for instance driving speed.
All the components are taken into account in the conceptual model of the behaviour of traffic participants in blind spot situations. The essence of this model is that the truck driver forms a world view by perceiving a situation in a certain context, possibly limited by physical boundaries (such as blind spot). This world view is a short term mental model of the environment and situation, which is built up by an “internal loop” guiding the perception of the driver and at the same time receiving input of this perception until an acceptable level of certainty is reached and a decision is made by the driver and an action is performed. The available resources also play a role in this process. In case the required resources are more than the available resources, not enough attention can be paid for a correct perception of the situation. This could lead to an incorrect world view resulting in an incorrect interpretation and inadequate actions.
Analysis based on the conceptual model gives insight into the possible errors that could occur with respect to blind spot incidents and how a system has to signal or override in an effective way.
Based on the OWI model the following qualitative criteria for a blind spot detection system were formulated:
1 The system should be able to detect the vulnerable road user well.
2 The system should not increase driver workload.
3 Information about the vulnerable road user in the blind spot should be clearly perceptible for the driver.
4 A supporting blind spot system should make a clear distinction between critical and non-critical situations.
5 A supporting blind spot system should issue a warning when there is enough time left for the driver to react.
6 A supporting blind spot system should only take over in very time critical situations by bringing the truck to a stand still.
7 The warning of a blind spot detection system should be essentially different from the way it informs the driver. From the analysis of the factors that contributed caused 37 blind spot accidents in
The Netherlands, it turned out that vehicle characteristics and workload were most often mentioned. A system that informs the driver in a subtle way that bicycles are present in the blind spot, will prevent part of the analyzed accidents. From the analysis of critical situations it becomes clear that there is only a limited amount of situations resulting in a blind spot accident. This is import to take into account when designing a system that needs to recognize these critical situations. A system that only warns when the wheels are already turning will probably not be able to prevent all blind spot accidents because these critical situations already exist before turning the wheels.
More quantitative analysis about the required quality of detection and signaling, i.e. the “operational envelope” in which systems should work, will be performed by means of simulation and other further studies.
an overview of existing blind spot systems and techniques, interviews with drivers, formulating a conceptual model of the factors that lead to certain action and interactions of traffic participants in blind spot situations. Based on the gained knowledge and the conceptual model, an optimal blind spot detection and signaling system is defined. In the literature survey a number of models is discussed that deal with information processing and workload of truck drivers and drivers in general. These models show that a truck driver sometimes overlooks another vulnerable road user because of ‘structural inference’. This means that the direct view on the other road user is blocked or the driver just looked in the other direction. Another reason is ‘resource competition’, referring to a limited information processing capacity, by which not all visual information can be processed by the driver. Information processing in a certain situation is therefore dependent on the workload of a driver and therefore also dependent on the task demands of the traffic situation. The task demands are not only determined by the complexity of the traffic situation, but also on the choices the truck driver makes with regard to for instance driving speed.
All the components are taken into account in the conceptual model of the behaviour of traffic participants in blind spot situations. The essence of this model is that the truck driver forms a world view by perceiving a situation in a certain context, possibly limited by physical boundaries (such as blind spot). This world view is a short term mental model of the environment and situation, which is built up by an “internal loop” guiding the perception of the driver and at the same time receiving input of this perception until an acceptable level of certainty is reached and a decision is made by the driver and an action is performed. The available resources also play a role in this process. In case the required resources are more than the available resources, not enough attention can be paid for a correct perception of the situation. This could lead to an incorrect world view resulting in an incorrect interpretation and inadequate actions.
Analysis based on the conceptual model gives insight into the possible errors that could occur with respect to blind spot incidents and how a system has to signal or override in an effective way.
Based on the OWI model the following qualitative criteria for a blind spot detection system were formulated:
1 The system should be able to detect the vulnerable road user well.
2 The system should not increase driver workload.
3 Information about the vulnerable road user in the blind spot should be clearly perceptible for the driver.
4 A supporting blind spot system should make a clear distinction between critical and non-critical situations.
5 A supporting blind spot system should issue a warning when there is enough time left for the driver to react.
6 A supporting blind spot system should only take over in very time critical situations by bringing the truck to a stand still.
7 The warning of a blind spot detection system should be essentially different from the way it informs the driver. From the analysis of the factors that contributed caused 37 blind spot accidents in
The Netherlands, it turned out that vehicle characteristics and workload were most often mentioned. A system that informs the driver in a subtle way that bicycles are present in the blind spot, will prevent part of the analyzed accidents. From the analysis of critical situations it becomes clear that there is only a limited amount of situations resulting in a blind spot accident. This is import to take into account when designing a system that needs to recognize these critical situations. A system that only warns when the wheels are already turning will probably not be able to prevent all blind spot accidents because these critical situations already exist before turning the wheels.
More quantitative analysis about the required quality of detection and signaling, i.e. the “operational envelope” in which systems should work, will be performed by means of simulation and other further studies.
TNO Identifier
408513
Publisher
TNO ; Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid (SWOV)
Collation
90 p.
Place of publication
Soesterberg