A consequence analysis method for out of area field storage
conference paper
AASTP-5, Part II establishes North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) guidelines for the storage, maintenance and transport of ammunition during deployed missions and operations.
It assists in the planning, reconnaissance and establishment of an Ammunition Area and the management of the ammunition. The document is designed for use by the Operational Commander’s specialist.
AASTP-5, Part II, defines - as a main part - the Field Distances (FDs) to be kept between PES (Potential Explosion Site) and PES (preventing prompt propagation of explosions) and between PES and ES (Exposed Site) (ensuring an appropriate safety level for exposed personnel and public). In cases where these FDs cannot be applied, e.g. due to lack of
available area or tactical mission requirements, a consequence and/or risk analysis has to be conducted before making a decision to deviate from the FDs.
NATO AC/326 (CNAD Ammunition Safety Group) has asked CHE and NLD to develop a consequence and risk analysis method to be incorporated in AASTP-5, Part II. For this purpose BK&P has developed the general outline of the method, while TNO Defence, Security and Safety calculated the explosion effects and consequence data. The consequences are expressed in terms of lethality, injury, and damage to assets. The method enables to take into account protective measures like barricades, and overhead protection, and distinguishes between different types of structures relevant to Out of Area (OoA) operations. This paper describes the results obtained so far.
It assists in the planning, reconnaissance and establishment of an Ammunition Area and the management of the ammunition. The document is designed for use by the Operational Commander’s specialist.
AASTP-5, Part II, defines - as a main part - the Field Distances (FDs) to be kept between PES (Potential Explosion Site) and PES (preventing prompt propagation of explosions) and between PES and ES (Exposed Site) (ensuring an appropriate safety level for exposed personnel and public). In cases where these FDs cannot be applied, e.g. due to lack of
available area or tactical mission requirements, a consequence and/or risk analysis has to be conducted before making a decision to deviate from the FDs.
NATO AC/326 (CNAD Ammunition Safety Group) has asked CHE and NLD to develop a consequence and risk analysis method to be incorporated in AASTP-5, Part II. For this purpose BK&P has developed the general outline of the method, while TNO Defence, Security and Safety calculated the explosion effects and consequence data. The consequences are expressed in terms of lethality, injury, and damage to assets. The method enables to take into account protective measures like barricades, and overhead protection, and distinguishes between different types of structures relevant to Out of Area (OoA) operations. This paper describes the results obtained so far.
TNO Identifier
360635
Source title
34th Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board Seminar (DDESB), Portland, Oregon, USA, 13-15 July 2010
Pages
40 p. (18 p. (Session 13.1) + 12 sheets)