Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Laan, C.M.; Barros, A.I.; Boucherie, R.J.; Monsuur, H.

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Title

Security Games with Probabilistic Constraints on the Agent’s Strategy

Author

Laan, C.M.
Barros, A.I.
Boucherie, R.J.
Monsuur, H.

Contributor

Kiekintveld, C. (editor)
Schauer, S. (editor)
An, B. (editor)
Rass, S. (editor)
Fang, F. (editor)

Publication year

2017

Abstract

This paper considers a special case of security games dealing with the protection of a large area divided in multiple cells for a given planning period. An intruder decides on which cell to attack and an agent selects a patrol route visiting multiple cells from a finite set of patrol routes such that some given operational conditions on the agent’s mobility are met. For example, the agent might be required to patrol some cells more often than others. In order to determine strategies for the agent that deal with these conditions and remain unpredictable for the intruder, this problem is modeled as a two-player zero-sum game with probabilistic constraints such that the operational conditions are met with high probability.We also introduce a variant of the basic constrained security game in which the payoff matrices change over time, to allow for the payoff that may change during the planning period.

Subject

2015 Human & Operational Modelling
MO - Military Operations
ELSS - Earth, Life and Social Sciences
Defense applications
Game theory
Probability constraints
Cells
Cytology
Decision theory
High probability
Multiple cells
Operational conditions
Planning period
Probabilistic constraints
Security games
Zero-sum game
Game theory